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Abstract 
A low second to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) has been related to high testosterone 
levels and to markers of  high status. In a social dilemma context status can be 
obtained either by acting egoistically (i.e. not contributing one's share) or by acting 
altruistically (i.e. contributing more than one's fair share). We therefore predicted that 
a low 2D:4D would be associated with high levels of  egoism and altruism and low 
levels of  common cooperativeness (i.e. contributing exactly one's fair share). We 
found the exact opposite: participants with a low 2D:4D were more likely to act 
cooperatively and less likely to act altruistically and egoistically. These findings 
suggest that (1) there might be a high and a low testosterone strategy to gain status 
and (2) that the high testosterone strategy is characterized by a preference for 
normative behavior. 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  3 
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A low second to fourth digit ratio (2D:4D) has been related to high prenatal 
testosterone levels (Manning et aI., 1998; Manning, 2002) and to a number of 
psychological factors such as masculine gender identity (Csatho et aI., 2003), 
aggression in men (Bailey & Hurd, in press), high status in competitive sports 
(Manning & Taylor, 2001) and in music (Sluming & Manning, 2000). In younger 
humans, a low 2D:4D has been related to lower levels of  pro  social behavior in pre-
school girls (but not in boys) (Williams, Greenhalgh, & Manning, 2003), and to 
physical (but not verbal) aggression in school boys (Manning & Wood, in Manning, 
2002). High testosterone has been related to high dominance status (Mazur & Booth, 
1998) and the correlates of  a low 2D:4D seem consistent with this interpretation. 
Hitherto, a low 2D:4D has been related to outcomes that mark status (e.g. status 
in music, fertility; Manning, 2002), or to traits that are believed to either lead to, 
maintain, or reflect high status (e.g. gender identity, and aggression). In this paper, we 
explore whether the relationship between 2D:4D and status exists at the behavioral 
level. Testosterone seems to have an impact on social behavior (Mazur & Booth, 
1998). A well-documented type of social behavior is cooperative behavior in social 
dilemmas. Social dilemmas are characterized by a conflict between collective and 
individual interests (Hardin, 1968). 
The findings reported in the literature do not allow straightforward predictions 
with respect to cooperativeness in low 2D:4D people. There are two possibilities. Low 
levels of  cooperation in social dilemmas are typical of  a strategy that strives towards 
maximizing the differences between one's own benefits and those of  others (van 
Lange, 1999). Two other often used interactive strategies, specifically 'maximizing 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  4 
one's own gains', and 'minimizing the difference between one's own benefits and 
those of  others' , often yield higher levels of  cooperation in social dilemrnas. Because 
one individual's status gain entails an other individual's status loss by definition, a 
strategy that maximizes differences between one's own and others' benefits (i.e. low 
cooperation levels) seems consistent with status gain, and hence, with higher levels of 
testosterone. 
Hypothesis 1 therefore proposes that a lower 2D:4D, as a marker of  higher 
prenatal testosterone level and a precursor of  high status, should be related to lower 
contribution levels in social dilemmas. This comes down to a positive correlation 
between 2D:4D and contribution level.  A low 2D:4D ratio has indeed been shown to 
be related to lower levels of  (aggregate) pro  social behavior and lower social cognition 
(Williams et aI., 2003), at least in girls. 
There is a second possibility. Other literature suggests that the relation between 
2D:4D and contribution in social dilemmas might not be linear but rather curvilinear. 
To explain the reasoning, it is useful to distinguish altruistic behavior from 'common' 
cooperativeness. In many social dilemmas people have a clear idea about what 
constitutes appropriate behavior and free-riding. Paying for one's ticket for the opera 
is appropriate, whereas trying to get in for free is not appropriate (i.e. is free-riding). 
In many real life circumstances, however, a third option exists: One can contribute 
more than the appropriate contribution level. To help the orchestra survive one could 
pay for a program booklet or contribute more than the ticket price. At first sight, this 
type of  behavior seems irrational. However, the cost incurred by such a type of 
behavior has been identified as a costly signal of some underlying quality (e.g. Glazer 
& Komad, 1996; Roberts, 1998; Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997). Consistent with the costly 
signaling perspective on altruism, altruistic behavior has been shown to be 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  5 
competitive on some occasions (Barclay, 2004), and has been shown to increase 
status, both in fieid settings (Bliege-bird, Smith, &  Bird, 2001) and in lab situations 
(Dewitte & De Cremer, 2004). 
Because a low 2D:4D seems to be related to high status (see above), and 
altruism (i.e. doing more than what is "appropriate") appears in the recent literature as 
one means to reach high status (e.g. Bliege-Bird et aI., 2001), altruism might be 
related to a low 2D:4D. Considering that acquiring resources (e.g. hunting large 
game) involves a lot of  risky behavior (e.g. Bliege-Bird et al. 2001), a link between 
testosterone and altruism is at least conceivable. This leads to hypothesis 2: a low 
2D:4D might be related to higher levels of  egoism and higher levels of  altruism in 
social dilemmas, and to lower levels of'  appropriate' levels of  cooperative behavior. 
Therefore, according to hypothesis 2 we expect a quadratic relationship between 
2D:4D and contribution level. 
Typical social dilemma games often obscure altruistic acts because only two 
options (i.e. cooperate or not) are available to the players or because it does not make 
much sense to give more than what is appropriate. In this paper, we adapted the 
traditional public good game slightly to allow differentiation between cooperation and 
altruism. In this way we could tease both hypotheses apart. 
Participants. Seventy undergraduate students (43 women and 27 men) at the 
University of  Leuven, aged between 18 and 23, participated in this study. The 
monetary reward depended on their performance (with a minimum of 5 euro, €1  ~ 
$1). 
Method. We used a social dilemma situation, namely a repeated public good 
game with four players. At the beginning of  each round of  the game, all participants 
received an endowment of  40 points. In each round, they had to decide how much of 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  6 
the endowment they would invest in the public good or keep for themselves. 
Decisions were made simultaneously. Every point was worth 3.39 eurocent. All the 
points that were invested, were subtracted from their 40 points endowment. When the 
sum of  all contributions reached the provision point  (= 1  00 points), 160 points (= the 
public good) were distributed equally across the four players, irrespective of  their 
individual contributions. The norm equals the provision point divided by the number 
of  players. In a pre-test (N = 32), we asked what the appropriate behavior would be in 
this type of  situation. Ninety-seven percent of  the people answered that people should 
invest 25 points, which suggests that this is indeed the appropriate behavior in this 
situation. 
Upon arrival in the laboratory, each participant was assigned to a computer in a 
partially enclosed carrel. Participants did not see one another and could not talk. They 
believed that they played a game involving six people, but in reality they played 
against the PC.  We told that four of  the six participants were players in the game, and 
that two others were observers of  the game. The observers did not play themselves 
But they were told that the roles of  player and observer could change randomly during 
the game. 
All participants started as an observer and they observed twice that the good 
was not obtained. In the first round, the shortage was 5 (out of 100) points. In the 
second round, the shortage was 2 points (out of 100). They did not receive 
information about individual contribution levels. After the first two rounds, the 
participants replaced one person in the game and had to decide how much to invest in 
the public good. We distinguished three behavioral categories, defined in relation to 
the fair share, i.e. the provision point divided by the number of  players (= 25). They 
could contribute either exactly the fair share (= cooperative decision), less than the 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  7 
fair share (= egoistic decision), or more than the fair share (= altruistic decision). We 
registered participants' decisions (cooperative, egoistic or altruistic) in the first round 
they played (i.e. the third round of  the game). The first hypothesis implies that 2D:4D 
will be lower among egoistic decision makers than among cooperative and altruistic 
decision makers. The reasoning underlying hypothesis I, however, does not allow to 
predict a difference between cooperative and altruistic decision makers. In contrast, 
the second hypothesis implies that 2D:4D will be higher among the cooperative 
decision makers and lower among both egoistic and altruistic decision makers (i.e. the 
two strategies that are related to high status). To make both hypotheses clear, we 
present them in a graph (see Figure 1). 
*  *  insert Figure 1 about here** 
After the game, the right-hand was scanned to measure finger lengths. 
Participants placed their hand palms on the glass plate of  a scanner. We ensured that 
details of  major creases could be seen on the scans. Lengths of  the second and fourth 
digits were measured from the ventral proximal crease of  the digit to the finger tip by 
means of  an Adobe® Photoshop 7.0 tool. We measured from the most proximal 
crease when there was a band of creases at the base of  the digit. Using scanned 
pictures is a valid method to measure finger lengths (Williams et aI., 2003). 
Reliability a/measurement. The lengths of  index (2D) and ring (4D) fingers 
were measured twice by the same rater with a time span of ten weeks. The two 
measurements of2D:4D were highly correlated (r = .96,p < .0001, N = 70). In the 
analysis, we used the average between the two measurements. An independent rater 
also measured finger lengths. His computed 2D:4Ds were highly correlated with the 
compound measure (r =.95). Raters were blind to contribution level and gender. 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  8 
Results. In accordance with previous literature (e.g. Fink et aI., 2004; Lippa, 
2003; Manning, 2002; Williams et aI., 2003), 2D:4D was significantly lower for men 
(M = .956, SD = .025) than for women (M = .975, SD = .027; t(68) = -3.01,p <.005). 
Thirty participants acted cooperatively, 19 altruistically and 21  egoistically. In 
contrast with hypothesis 1, the correlation between contribution size and 2D:4D was 
not positive, r = -.06 (ns., for men and women resp. -.01, ns. and -.03, ns.). We 
performed a 2 (Sex) by 3 (Public Goods Choice) factorial Anova to examine 
hypothesis 2. We found a significant main effect of Sex (F (1,64) = 7.95,p < .01) and 
a marginally significant main effect of  Public Goods Choice (Megoistic = 0.972, 
SDegoistic = .026; Mcooperative = 0.959, SDcooperative = .024; Maltruistic = 0.977, SDaltruistic = 
.031; F (2,64) = 2.99,p < .06). As expected, the quadratic trend was significant (F (1, 
64) = 5.82,p < .04). However, Figure 2 shows that the trend went in the opposite 
direction as expected in hypothesis 2.  Players that contributed the fair share, had a 
lower 2D:4D than either the players that contributed more than the fair share or the 
players that contributed less than the fair share. The interaction between Sex and 
Public Goods Choice did not approach significance (F (2, 64) =  .70, P =  .50). Figure 2 
shows that the trend is parallel for men and women. 
**insert Figure 2 about here** 
Discussion. In the public good game we designed, we found a curvilinear 
relation between the 2D:4D ratio (reflecting prenatal testosterone level) and level of 
contribution. Specifically, egoists and altruists (as identified through their choice) had 
a relatively higher 2D:4D, whereas common cooperators had a relatively lower 
2D:4D. How could our findings that a low 2D:4D is related to norm-consistent 
cooperative behavior in a public good game be reconciled with traits such as 
aggression and masculinity that have been related to a low 2D:4D? We consider that 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  9 
acting cooperatively in the public good game reflects a strong preference for social 
norms (= giving the fair share). Possibly, the status indicators that are related to a low 
2D:4D require a strong preference for normative behavior. For instance, becoming a 
top soccer player implies high skill but also requires the player to follow the rules of 
the game and the coach's instructions. Czikszentmihalyi (1997) interviewed hundreds 
of  very successful people in domains as various as top sports, science, business, and 
arts. The most salient characteristic common to all these people was that their 
creativity relied on a profound knowledge of  their field. Compliance with the ruling 
standards seems to be a necessary condition to reach the top, whatever the domain one 
is in. Aggression and masculinity might be related to cooperation if  one considers that 
those following the cooperative norm are willing to punish those who free-ride (Fehr 
&  Gachter, 2002). Consistently, Axelrod (1984) found that the most successful 
interactive strategies in social dilemma's was nice but tough (i.e. retaliatory). 
Given that altruism is related to status (Bliege-bird, Smith, & Bird, 2001) as 
well as to high 2D:4D, the relation between 2D:4D (and testosterone) and status might 
be less linear than previously assumed. Possibly, two major strategies to obtain status 
could exist next to each other (Hemich & Gil-white, 2001): (1) the well-known 
testosterone driven, norm-abiding, aggressive, 'masculine' strategy yielding 
dominance status, and (2) a non-normative, generous, 'feminine' strategy yielding 
prestige status. The former seems related to low 2D:4D, and the latter might be related 
to high 2D:4D. We call for future research that explores the possible fitness 
advantages of  a high 2D:4D, and the environmental moderators that determine which 
strategy is the best. We also do not know at this point whether current testosterone 
levels or rather an early formed personality trait mediates the relation between 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  10 
prenatal testosterone and cooperative behavior. Insight into this process might also 
help explain the relation between norm-following cooperation and testosterone. 2D:4D and cooperative behavior  11 
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Figure 2.  2D:4D as afunction a/public goods choice 
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